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Abstract
The literature of risk, mitigation, and resilience
is rich in classifications and recommendations. The
missing link is evaluation: ideally, data based;
initially, based on expert judgment. We present a
novel approach for eliciting probability distributions
describing mitigation effectiveness. This approach
can be used by subject matter experts (SMEs) who
are not specialists in mathematics or engineering.
A visual interface permits each expert to sketch a
distribution by moving five colored dots on the user
interface. The engine can weight and combine
estimates from several SMEs into an aggregate
density function suitable for presentation, and an
aggregate cumulated distribution for use in Monte Carlo
simulations. Additional supporting software adapts
the tool for real-time support of virtual Delphi-type
sessions involving multiple distributed experts. Use of
the tool in a study aimed at controlling information
and communication technology supply chain risks yields
valuable information on those threats, and on the tool
itself.
1. Introduction and Some Related
Literature
Resilience and mitigation are widely used concepts,
which overlap in many ways. Here we use “mitigation”
to refer to policies and processes intended to reduce
risk, and “resilience” to refer to the expected or
stochastic reduction in risk, resulting from specific
mitigations. There is an enormous literature on both
of these concepts. For resilience in the context of
supply chains, which is the focus of the work reported
here, the review by Han et al. [1] found some 45
empirical studies and 70 that they characterized as
conceptual. They identified some 11 distinct aspects
of resilience for which metrics can and have been
developed. These range from maintaining customer
satisfaction to efficiency of responding to disruptions,
and effectiveness in reconstructing an impaired supply
chain. In real world applications of the procedures
described here, each Decision Maker (DM) will assign
different weights for these quantifiable aspects, and
each SME will have some particular subset in mind,
when asked about the effectiveness of mitigations. In
addition to the specific focus on supply chain resilience
(SCRE), one may look more widely for metrics that
can be applied to quantitatively assess the effectiveness
of a mitigation, in terms of whatever measure of
performance P (t) is observed over the course of time
t. A very thorough review of these, drawn from many
sectors, including power and manufacturing is given
by Chen et al. [2]. Those authors emphasize that
the time integral of the deficit may not be an adequate
measure of impact. This is particularly important when
the disruption occurs early in the supply chain. In
that case, a sudden shock may produce much greater
disruption, as its effects hit all the downstream nodes or
multiple agents rush to respond, than would an equally
large total deficit that arises more slowly. This issue
is discussed very recently by [3]. The world-wide
disruptions attributable largely to COVID-19 (although
the Suez canal blockage could have happened at any
time) have made decision-makers at every level much
more aware of the importance of supply chain resilience.
Decision-makers at various levels will have different
performance measures. Auto-makers, for example, want
to secure their own supplies of chips. A national
level decision maker may be more concerned that all
automakers maintain adequate supplies. Governors of
individual states may (and did) compete for personal
protective equipment; national decision makers want to
ensure supplies go where they are needed. Because
of these differences, eliciting estimates of mitigation
effectiveness, which is the key goal of this research,
must first decide whether to dig into the finest details,
articulating specific threats and mitigations, or to seek
a framework that will be useful and usable by any
decision-making organization (DMO), with its own
agreed-upon metrics and priorities. The research





reported here was done in the context of a broad study
across many industry and government aspects of the
Information and Communications Technology supply
chain (ICTSC). Because of this broad scope it was not
feasible to dig into fine details. Therefore the focus is
on a broad framework, and supporting tools, that can be
used by any DMO. This is in contrast to, for example,
the detailed estimates developed for nuclear reactor risk
assessment, where complex chains of events can have
catastrophic consequences.
In addition to specifying the granularity, which we
take to be broad, one should consider the degree of
engagement expected from SMEs who are providing
input. At one extreme, nuclear safety studies may ask
for days of engagement from experts, who may do
specific calculations to support their estimates. The
present study is at the opposite extreme, limiting the
engagement of SMEs to at most a few hours.
With these two specifications, the research needs
an easy-to-use tool that is accessible to a broad
range of SMEs without extensive training, and which
recognizes that there will be many different measures
of effectiveness. There is one more issue to consider:
how shall we describe effectiveness? We have elected
to describe effectiveness in terms of the reduction in
risk, and, furthermore, to recognize that an expert cannot
give a point value for this reduction, but may be able to
describe a range and distribution across that range. Thus
we are eliciting the probability distribution of a fraction.
Technically, this appears the same as estimating an
unknown probability, since both the probability and the
fractional reduction in risk lie in the interval [0, 1].
Review of classical methods, and the
most-up-to-date extensions of these classical methods
developed by [4], [5], [6] reflect their grounding in
twentieth century pedagogy of statistics and probability.
Those traditions strongly favor parametric distributions,
such as the Gaussian or Beta distributions, with
a preference for distributions having a conjugate
Bayesian partner. That relation ensures that strict
Bayesian multiplicative update to represent new
information retains the parametric form of the prior
distribution. While this makes analysis and graphical
presentation of results easier, it may obscure the nature
and degree of disagreement among the participating
experts. E.g., with Gaussian models, two experts who
agree that a parameter has variance 1 but disagree
on the mean, favoring values µ = 5, 10 will find
their judgments combined to a uni-modal aggregate
whose mode they both reject. Combining this with
the knowledge that our findings will be used in
computationally intensive simulation modeling, we
prefer a simple but non-traditional model for the elicited
distributions.
This approach is hinted at, but not realized, in some
other approaches that stem from ecology including, in
particular, the MATCH project at Nottingham [7]. In
that system a user may specify a distribution in terms
of a histogram, which is completely not parametric.
This has the advantage that an expert can express fairly
complicated ideas, such as a trimodal distribution. On
the other hand, it does lose the intuition associated with
the notion of either the mode (most likely) or the median
(50-50).
NOVELTY: We sought a simpler way of providing
an adequate range of expression. We report on a
new tool for eliciting and integrating “soft triangular”
distributions and conditional probabilities. The new
tools for group elicitation of quantitative findings about
probability distributions [8] extend the classic methods
for the combination of probabilities initiated by [9].
For reviews and other extensions on the combination of
probabilities see also [10, 11, 12]. An important review
of the whole field of probability estimates is given in
[13].
CONTEXT: In summary, this work arose in
estimating the effectiveness of countermeasures or
mitigations used to protect or increase the resilience
of supply chains. The particular sector of interest
is the Information and Communication Technology
sector, which includes both hardware and software.
The particular cases discussed here concentrate on the
hardware aspect. A notional model offered to SMEs is
construction of a laptop by assembling items such as a
motherboard, a keyboard and a screen, at a plant that
forms the case to contain these parts and completes the
assembly. Further details of this project are described in
[14].
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
in Section 2 we review the overall problem of eliciting
distributions. In Section 3 we discuss the specific
research context. We summarize the underlying
mathematics in Section 4; in Section 5 we sketch the
system, and in Sections 6,7 we sketch the visual and
functional properties of the several interfaces. Section
8 provides a few representative findings, and in Section
9 we discuss possible conclusions and extensions, both
methodological and project specific.
2. Eliciting Distributions
As noted, SMEs may express their uncertainty in
a parametric (mean and variance) or non-parametric
(sketch a curve) fashion. Some experts, with experience
in the insurance industry, suggested using triangular
distributions. Typically one elicits the most likely value
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(mode) of the uncertain number, and constrains it with
the highest and lowest reasonable values. This approach
is sound if the expert’s estimate is essentially symmetric
about the mode, in which case the mode is essentially
the median and the mean. If the range is far from
symmetric, using a triangular distribution means that
that one side is weighted much more than the other. Our
conversations with experts suggest that the notion of a
“50-50 value” (median) is more comfortable than asking
for a “most probable value.” Thus, if triangles are to be
used, they should be allowed to “stretch” on one side,
while remaining triangular on the other, so that the area,
or total probability remains the same on both sides of the
median.
To capture some of the virtues of both the histogram
approach and the triangle approach, we developed a tool
that permits the SME to specify median and range, and
also increase the probability of extreme events in that
range, as described below.
To apply this tool, and the underlying approach, one
must narrow the threats and focus on countermeasures
“suitable for quantitative assessment.” Can we find a
way to quantify the impact of a mitigation, in a language
that does not depend on the specifics of the metric?
We require only that the metric be defined on a ratio
scale, so that the notions of 0% or 100% mitigation are
meaningful. One expert might assess 90% effectiveness
at preventing shipment delays. Another expert might
characterize the loss as “a combination of lost orders,
reputational damage, and overtime costs.” and add “But
I think that this mitigation will cut losses by about half.”
Of course the dollar value at a small company will be
much less than the dollar value at a large company, for
any given level of risk reduction.
Faced with this complex reality, and informants
from both large (billion dollar) and small (less than
$50 million) firms, we sought a “precisely flexible”
definition of effectiveness. We operationalize the
meaning of “the amount of risk reduction” using two
equations. The first is familiar throughout the field of
risk management and sets the “unmitigated” risk, R0,
associated to a threat as given by Equation 1.
R0 = Consequences ∗ V ulnerability ∗ Threat (1)
In engineering terms the three factors are understood
as follows:
• Threat: the probability of the harmful event
• Vulnerability: the conditional probability that the
event will “succeed” in causing harm(s)
• Consequences: the specific harm(s) that the event
will produce, if it succeeds.
We find that subject matter experts are familiar
with this “word equation” even if they lack engineering
background. Note that any specific mitigation might
affect one, two, or all three of the factors. For
example, if theft is the risk, a watchdog may apprehend
a thief (reducing vulnerability) or deter a thief (reducing
threat). SMEs may often disagree about which factor
dominates and yet agree on the overall mitigation
through the product of the factors.
Our elicitation therefore includes a working
definition of effectiveness as the reduction in overall
risk, however the responding expert prefers to define it.
As an example we found that some experts considered
a hurricane’s damage to a production facility, while
others considered that it may block truck transport. In
sum, effectiveness E is defined implicitly by its role in
Equation 2.
ReducedRisk = (1−E) ∗R0 (2)
The heavy font used here calls attention to the
fact that E is not a simple number, but is a random
variable representing many kinds of uncertainty. That
uncertainty may be due to specifics of the threat such
as a hurricane, variation in the impact of the mitigation
(e.g, attending to weather forecasts), or subjective
uncertainty on the part of the expert about how to
summarize his or her own experience in a numerical
form. We cannot eliminate any of these uncertainties.
However, formulating the effectiveness of mitigation
in this way requires us to elicit the distribution of a
bounded parameter.
3. Specific Research Context
This work is part of research examining the
resiliency of the Information and Communication
Technology Supply Chain against a variety of threats,
both natural and man-made, discussed in [14]. The
aim is to develop and pilot a methodology for
assessing the mitigating impact, on resiliency, of specific
countermeasures, while incorporating both stochastic
and ontological uncertainties.
Building on the distributions elicited by the methods
presented here, the simulation team provides Monte
Carlo distributions of the benefit to the overall network
of each specific countermeasure, and of selected
combinations of mitigations. The simulation results
are further used in optimization calculations, using
Mixed Integer Linear Programming to provide the
optimal reduction in risk for each budget level under
consideration.
We summarize here the key steps of the study.
• Review literature and government reports; focus
on specific threat scenarios
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• Talk with experts, to further focus and confirm
selected threats
• Extensive (30+ minutes; N=34) one-on-one
conversations with experts, particularly those
whose experience supports quantitative estimates
of countermeasure effectiveness. Zoom facilitates
recording and transcription for qualitative review
such as grounded [15] content analysis [16].
• Focus group discussions of four to six SMEs.
Zoom technology makes it feasible to assemble
outstanding experts but the mediated technology
is tiring. The target of 90 minutes, with some
garrulous experts has reduced the time available
for data collection. We find that experts can assess
some 7 to 12 (threat, countermeasure) pairs in
15 to 20 minutes. Brief training videos (3 to 4
minutes long) acclimate experts to the interface.
• Integration of the expert results for each specific
focus group (examples below) in graphical form,
for reporting and qualitative analysis
• Monte Carlo simulation and optimization studies,
as described above.
4. Mathematical Models
4.1. The user interface algorithm
Each expert is invited to provide his or her estimate
of the risk reduction probability distribution function in
one of the two forms, depending on how the survey is
configured: either a “distorted triangle” or a “bucket
distribution”.
The bucket distribution is simply a
piecewise-constant function with N (e.g. N = 10)
“buckets”. In surveys using this distribution, the expert
would indicate, by moving tokens into buckets, the
probability that the risk reduction is (for N = 10)
between 0 and 10%, between 10% and 20%, etc.
This was developed replicating the least parametric
model used by [7], as a “back-up” alternative, in
case the “distorted triangle” (also called “five-point”)
distribution should prove unacceptable to participating
experts.
In surveys with distorted-triangle probability
distributions, the shape of the distribution is controlled
by five data elements: x1, y2, x3, y4, x5, where
0 ≤ x1 < x3 < x5 ≤ 1, y2 ≥ 0, and y4 ≥ 0. These
are read off, by the algorithm, from the locations (see
Figure 1 of the blue point at (x3, ymax), the green
points at (x1, 0) and (x5, 0), and the yellow points at
(x1, y2), (x5, y4).
The soft-triangle distribution is defined so that the
distribution function f(x) has the following properties:
• The support of the distribution is [x1, x5].
• The median of the distribution is at x3.
• If y2 = y4 = 0, then f(x) is unimodal with
the mode at x3; the distribution function f(x)
is continuous, increasing from f(x1) = 0 to
f(x3) = ymax, and then decreasing to f(x5) = 0.
• If y2 = 0.5/(x3 − x1), then f(x) = y2 on
the entire segment (x1, x3). Similarly, if y4 =
0.5/(x5 − x3), then f(x) = y4 on the entire
segment (x3, x5).
In particular, with y2 = y4 = 0, we define f(x) so
that it is linear on the shorter wing of the distribution,
and a monomial power function on the longer wing, the
exponent being chosen so that x3 remains the median.
Thus, if x3 − x1 < x5 − x3, the distribution function is
defined as
f(x) = (x− x1)/(x3 − x1)2 (3)














for x ∈ [x3, x5].
The additional distribution parameters, y2 and y4,
are controlled in the user interface by the vertically
movable yellow points, and allow the expert to
individually modify the left and right wings of the
distribution. By raising the left yellow control point
(x1, y2) the user can create a discontinuity in the
distribution, raising the left end of the left wing (and
proportionally lowering the right end of that wing, so
that the the area under the wing stays 0.5, keeping the
median of the distribution at x3). This is implemented
by the following distribution (assuming x3 − x1 <
x5 − x3):
f(x) = y2 +R2(x− x1)/(x3 − x1)2 (6)
for x ∈ [x1, x3], and








with the same k as above, and the values R2 and R4





f(x)dx = 0.5. (8)
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Figure 1. The subject matter expert’s graphical interface.
4.2. Calculation of weighted means and
medians
We provide several different measures of
aggregation based upon: equally weighted, reported
confidence, and narrowness of the range. For each
weighting scheme we compute both the mean and the
median of the cumulated distributions.
Weights. For both the averaged and
median-cumulative distributions, a variety of weighting
schemes are available, as follows.
1. Equal weights: wj = 1 for each expert j who
has provided an estimate for the countermeasure
in question.
2. Explicit confidence-based weights: each expert is
asked to explicitly rate his or her confidence in
each estimate, as a positive integer number within
a certain range (1 through 7). This number (or
a certain default, if none is provided) is directly
used as the weight wj of the estimate.
3. Width-based weights. This presumes that
a high-precision estimate (e.g. “21-22%
reduction”) represents greater confidence or
knowledge than a less-defined one (“between 0
and 50%”). Accordingly, the inverse of the
width of the support of the probability distribution
provided by the expert is used as the weight of his
or her estimate, wj = 1/(x5 − x1).
Averaged density function. Assuming that n
experts provided their probability estimates fj(x) (j =
1, . . . , n) for a given countermeasure, and a particular
weighting scheme with weights w1, . . . , wn has been
chosen, we compute (as the green curve, see Figure
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Median cumulative distribution function. With an
odd number of estimates with equal weights, we can
compute the cumulative distribution function (Fj(x) =∫ x
0
fj(t)dt) for each one, and ask, for any given x, which
of those cumulative distribution functions represents
the median of the experts’ opinions – that is, who is
the expert k such that half of the remaining experts
provided a lower value for the cumulative distribution
function than k did (i.e., their Fj(x) < Fk(x)), and
the other half provided a higher value than k did)?
More generally, we want to compute Fmed(x) such
that for any x, it represents the weighted median of all
experts’ cumulative distribution functions. We define it
as follows:
• It may happen that for this x there is an expert
k such that only a “weighted minority” of
experts provides a lower value of F (x), and only




wj < 0.5 and∑
j:Fj(x)>Fk(x)
wj < 0.5. If such an expert
exists, we view k as the “median expert” for x,
and define, for this x, Fmed(x) = Fk(x).
• It may happen that no such “median” k exists,
because the set of experts can be split into
two non-overlapping subsets ([1, ..., n] = S1 ∪





j∈S2 wj = 0.5
∑
j wj)
such that everybody in the first group gives a
lower cumulative distribution function value than
everybody in the second:
max
j∈S1
Fj(x) = m < M = min
j∈S1
Fj(x).
In this case, we use the midpoint of the gap
between the two groups as the median value, i.e.
define Fmed(x) = (m+M)/2.
The function Fmed(x) constructed in this way
behaves as a cumulative distribution function on [0, 1],
i.e. it is continuous and monotonically non-decreasing,
with Fmed(0) = 0 and Fmed(1) = 1. Its derivative
(which may not be continuous, even if those for each
individual expert are) has the properties of a density
function. Its numerical derivative is plotted (in gold, see
Figure 6 ) to serve as the median of the several experts’
probability density functions.
5. System Overview
For focus group processes input from the subject
matter experts is captured and processed in real
time. The system supports other management/research
functions. A moderator can query the data in real time,
in synchronous or focus group settings. Precise threats
and countermeasures are refined by the participants, and
can be captured in real time. An annotator interface
replaces traditional flip charts, and summarizes specific
threats, and selected countermeasures or mitigations.
The moderator can check to see when any SMEs
are not providing input, and when all estimates are
in. The moderator can show the aggregated density
function of the estimates, with each SME’s median
and width-based confidence signalled by a red dot.
This can support Delphi iterations, if such convergence
is desired. Finally, the system produces composite
graphs for review by management decision-makers, or
inclusion in reports and scientific communications, such
as Figure 6.
6. SME Interface
Usability of the SME interface is crucial and
informal anecdotal reports indicate that it is sufficiently
usable. Formal usability study will require a separate
project, exploring other domains requiring estimates of
a fraction or probability.
To use the system, each SME chooses an anonymous
working ID and proceeds to a selection dashboard,
shown in Figure 4. This shows a thumbnail sketch for
any countermeasures already assessed, and the SME
may revise a judgment or add a new one. Either
choice brings the expert to the central novelty of
this elicitation tool, the “5-point graphical elicitation
interface.” Instructions above the graphic interface
shown in Figure 1. recall the threat and countermeasure
with these guides.
• Assessing countermeasure: ”Analyzing physical
appearance against threat Counterfeit Parts”
• Please estimate the amount by which this
Countermeasure reduces the risk of this threat.
• Please move the blue dot to the 50-50 or median
point.
• Then move the green dots to sharpen the low and
high ends of your estimate.
• Finally, you may lift the yellow dots to make the
tails fatter if you desire.
Figure 5 shows how the distribution may change as
the points are moved. This wide range of odd shapes
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appears to be satisfactory to users, pending any more
detailed research on the user experience.
7. Group/Delphi Interfaces
The tool has three additional interfaces, for an
administrator, a moderator, and an annotator.
7.1. Administrator
Figure 2. Administrator’s Dashboard displaying the
groups (selection only).
An administrator may select any existing survey or
focus group, or create a new one. By default a group
closes after four hours, but can be set to remain open for
surveys involving many respondents. The interface may
be either the 5-point model described here or a 10-bin
interface as presented by [7]. A small excerpt of the
administrator interface is shown in Figure 2.
7.2. Moderator Interface
The moderator works with the group in real time,
controlling things from an interface not shown here, and
monitoring participant progress. In practice an open
Zoom window is used to share a spreadsheet in which
threats and countermeasures are recorded as they are
refined by each group.
7.3. Annotator Interface
Threats and countermeasures details are added by
the annotator during the discussion. Experts generally
reach an ad hoc decision that a countermeasure may
mitigate more than one threat, or may be subsumed
by another. The annotator works in real time, with
the interface shown in Figure 3. Threats are entered
into the pink area, while each countermeasure is
recorded separately in a green area. Each threat and
countermeasure has both a short name, and a longer text
description. These are replicated into the moderator’s
and expert’s dashboards.
Unlike a “flip chart,” the annotator’s interface is
not exposed to the SMEs in real time. Instead, we
have shared a (Google sheet) table of threats and
Figure 3. Annotator’s interface (example) .
countermeasures, with the moderator adding notes.
Screen space prevents replicating the physical focus
group model in which charts on the wall record what has
been is agreed upon. A technology that shows both the
shared document and the faces of all participants would
benefit this part of the work.
The moderator and annotator can both access the
moderator dashboard and, to open the system for
judgments, send the SMEs a hyperlink to the login page.
We have not imposed password protection, as the link
is a long random string, unlikely to be hacked during
during a brief 90 to 120 minute focus group or Delphi
session.
8. Representative Findings
The findings of any particular focus group are
best summarized in two different ways. For human
inspection and examination a visual array of aggregated
density curves, is most effective. A typical example
is given in Figure 6. In this particular instance, equal
weighting has been used. Columns each represent
a threat; rows represent the countermeasures to that
threat. Elements of the same row in different columns
generally represent different countermeasures. In this
matrix the columns represent: counterfeit parts; extreme
weather; and onboarding a new vendor. The mitigations
are (top down): For THREAT=Counterfeits: careful
examination of each part, serialization and database
review, and public key authentication of firmware; for
THREAT=Extreme weather: monitor weather forecasts,
diversify suppliers and transport, and regularly exercise
plans (a fourth, periodic audits of supply chain is not
visible in this extract); and for THREAT=Onboarding
a new vendor: contractually require background
and security checks, agree to security measures for
transmission and storage of intellectual property, and
quality control inspection of the facility.
Usually a wide-ranging discussion of threats and
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mitigations precedes the quantitative evaluation. For
example one group noted that “thoroughly vet the
management of a potential supplier” can be agreed to
include “monitor the financial stability of a potential
supplier” although, strictly speaking, one of them was
attached to the onboarding threat, and the other attached
to preventing counterfeits. We find that participants
quickly move to the essential elements of each proposed
countermeasure, and agree, for that session, to represent
a particular mitigation by an agreed-upon phrase. All
discussions are recorded and transcribed, to support
careful review. Two groups may settle on significantly
different interpretations of the same key phrase. For
this reason we do not propose to further aggregate the
results from distinct groups, even when the “names” of
the countermeasures may have been the same.
In each aggregated plot, Figure 6, we show both the
mean and the median of the experts’ estimates, with
the mean in green and the median in gold. There
are competing theoretical justifications for considering
either alternative. Generally the mean behaves in the
most intuitive way when examining the probability
densities visually. On the other hand, the median makes
better sense when the aggregation is used in simulation,
since it is robust to the outliers. There is not room here to
show those cumulated curves. As explained in Section
4.1, the median is defined by reference to the cumulated
distributions.
In each aggregated plot there is a red dot for each
of the individual experts. The x-coordinate reflects that
Figure 4. Experts Dashboard.
Figure 5. Three adjustments of the triangle. A: median moved right, towards 100% and range defined. B:
Longer tail increased. C: Shorter tail increased.
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expert’s estimate of the median, while the height of
the dot represents that expert’s confidence. In these
examples that height is computed from the tightness
of the range. This scheme makes it immediately clear
when there are substantial disagreements among the
experts. If the goal were to develop an appearance
of consensus it might make sense to conduct one or
two Delphi rounds to seek a more coherent picture.
That might, however, conceal significant uncertainties
about the true effectiveness of the given countermeasure.
In the example curves shown here the focus group
comprised four industry experts with a total of about 60
years’ experience, and they were fairly confident in their
assessments.
To illustrate how one may reason from
this information, it appears clear that the third
countermeasure for Counterfeit parts is judged strongly
more effective than the other two. The peak is farther to
the right, and sharper. Similarly, for Extreme weather,
the second and third countermeasures are clearly
judged more effective than the first. Even if one were
to remove the strongly held dissenting view at the
low end, the remainder is clearly broad, representing
great uncertainty as to just how effective monitoring
weather forecasts can be. (Parenthetically we note that
in discussion one SME emphasized that the weather
information is only as valuable as the plan that is
implemented when bad weather is predicted.)
9. Conclusions and Discussion
The tool presented here may support further research
in two ways. First, there are six methods of aggregation:
three weighting schemes and two ways of computing the
representative distribution (see Section 4.1). Second,
although only each expert’s most recent distribution is
Figure 6. An array of aggregated probability density functions. (See text)
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sketched in the visual summary, the five parameters of
every submission are retained, and can support later
analysis and Delphi iterations. Some prior studies
suggest “best mix” guidelines for a focus group, such
as [9]. Our early findings suggest that some experts
have specific quantitative knowledge, based on internal
engineering studies. Other experts have a broader
industry-wide view, often in association with a specific
plan or tool for increasing resilience. At this point it is
not known how best to mix such experts to produce the
most effective group aggregations.
This tool has the potential to rationalize
discussion of the quantitative benefits of mitigations
and countermeasures, complementing the cost
considerations that currently control adoption. While
the visual summaries of Figure 6 are helpful in
conversations with top managers, the concrete
aggregated distributions will support computations
of both the expected benefit of a mitigation and the
probability that risk exceeds some maximum acceptable
level. What appears most novel here is the combination
of a “top-down” formulation of the Effectiveness
concept, coupled with a practical tool for “bottom up”
elicitation of an uncertain parameter, from the most
knowledgeable SMEs.
The long term goal of this research is to influence
and transition to practice in government and industry.
Thus we plan not only to demonstrate the method,
but also to share tools that can be used to replicate
this analysis for specific instances, where the necessary
information is often proprietary or classified. Insofar
as such studies yield generalizable findings about
mitigation effectiveness it is hoped that use of
this methodology will also encourage and facilitate
information sharing, so that every organization can
apply its limited resources more effectively.
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